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KURDISH RELIEF AND REPATRIATION:

DOD - AID/OFDA PARTNERSHIP

*The AID/OFDA Kurdish Response After-Action Report
December 1991*

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**U S. Agency for International Development
Office of U S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
Washington, DC**

December 1991

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The Kurdish Response After-Action Report

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RELIEF AND REPATRIATION· DOD - AID/OFDA PARTNERSHIP

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) have a history of working together effectively in international humanitarian assistance efforts. Section I provides the background on OFDA and DOD joint humanitarian assistance activities, and lists the relative strengths of each. The number of the activities involving joint DOD and OFDA actions has increased over the last few years and the nature of some of these activities has evolved. The Panama, Kuwait and Kurd post-hostility actions have demonstrated a mutual dependency unknown in past joint efforts. The erosion of the East-West polarity is leading to world conditions which may result in instability similar to that of these recent events.

This report focuses on the aspects of the Kurd relief and repatriation effort which were jointly managed by OFDA and DOD. It places this effort in the evolving context of the worldwide humanitarian assistance events following hostilities. By doing that, "lessons learned" have been drafted to assist in determining the steps needed to improve those humanitarian assistance efforts in the future which might again be appropriately managed jointly by OFDA and DOD. The conclusion reached here reinforces a decision we understand has already been reached by DOD that post-hostilities planning to address humanitarian assistance requirements needs to be considerably strengthened.

The rapid and massive effort to bring relief to the Kurdish refugees isolated on the mountain border following Secretary of State Baker's visit has been widely covered and documented. Thousands of lives were saved through the responsiveness and the significant mobilization of DOD in Operation Provide Comfort. Less known are the specific actions taken to achieve one of the earliest refugee repatriations in recent history. This required a sequence of policy decisions and implementation actions condensed into a three month period from initiation to completion. The National Security Council and the State Department led the policy coordination efforts at the national level. DOD and OFDA participated in these efforts, then cooperated closely in Turkey and Northern Iraq to implement the decisions.

OFDA's normal role is to assess the conditions of an international emergency, then provide funding for relief efforts to Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) and International Organizations (IOs). To do this, OFDA dispatches a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). DART's role for the Kurd effort quickly changed to that of a planning consultant as well as a financial source to DOD, the U N and the PVOs who were engaged in the effort. DART's experience was used, in conjunction with Civil Affairs, military logistics, engineer and medical officers, to select the refugee camp site near Zakho, design the camp layout (using mostly OFDA's tents), organize the refugee reception and care procedures and

facilities, develop a repatriation plan in consultation with Kurd representatives, suggest to U S military staff security measures which would overcome the Kurd reluctance to repatriate, design a transition program to lead to turn the operation over to the U N , and mobilize the PVO efforts in northern Iraq DART funds were used to purchase bulk food, water, and camp supplies for the refugees, to construct water facilities, warehouse fences and lighting, and latrine modifications, and to bring in CARE and International Rescue Committee (IRC) representatives to manage the camp and village food distribution systems Centers For Disease Control (CDC) specialists on the DART provided authoritative reports and guidance on critical health matters

Several of our coalition allies also participated heavily in this relief and repatriation effort As a result, its success has generated considerable interest in how its lessons can be applied in the future This interest is currently evident in the U N General Assembly where spirited discussions are taking place concerning the strengthening the U N 's emergency response capabilities At the same time, the use of DOD in humanitarian assistance in most emergency situations continues to raise issues of sovereignty This is why in the U S , the AID Administrator has been designated as the President's Special Coordinator for emergency assistance - a civilian agency avoids the sensitivities involved when using DOD The immense capabilities of DOD have been systematically tapped through AID, as well as used at times when the circumstances make it appropriate (See Attachment 6 for recent articles commenting on the international debate)

We expect that the need for humanitarian interventions will recur, either following hostilities as previously experienced, or as a result of severe economic hardship or civil strife in countries which causes harmful effects in other countries The Kurd relief experience provided important lessons on a combined security-relief operation that can be the basis for anticipating future events The most important of these lessons involve security and security-related initiatives which help achieve rapid repatriation of the affected population The DART contributed to this by recommending the location of the refugee camps be as close to their homes as possible, the integration of refugee leaders into the planning process, the approach encouraging men to return first, the steps taken to neutralize the police through measures increasing the transparency of police actions, and the negotiation steps taken with ruling government authorities to assure that the various measures were adequately communicated and understood Effective communications links and methods are critical

In general terms, Operation Provide Comfort revealed that OFDA and DOD each has special strengths and vulnerabilities which should be carefully weighed in developing an approach for joint humanitarian assistance operations in the future Those directly involved in the operation generally agreed that while generic operational plans could not be developed to cover every contingency, a joint DOD/OFDA operations doctrine for humanitarian responses in complex international disasters could provide essential guidance for military field commanders in future Provide Comfort-type situations

An after-action workshop on the Kurdish humanitarian assistance operation was sponsored by OFDA on September 3 - 4, 1991 in Arlington, Virginia. Representatives from DOD, AID, OFDA, State Department, Centers for Disease Control and other public and private institutions involved in the Kurdish relief effort attended the workshop to identify positive actions as well as issues to be addressed as future joint complex humanitarian assistance operations are launched. The workshop participants came up with several recommendations for improving interagency procedures between DOD and OFDA and encouraging a stronger working relationship to support these types of complex operations. The workshop report is included here as Section III.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

OFDA makes the following recommendations as part of this report

- 1 That OFDA and DOD develop a "joint operations doctrine" for complex international emergencies. This plan would be developed by OFDA and DOD (Global Affairs with JCS and CINCs participation), and approved by the appropriate DOD, AID and State authorities. The strategy would provide general guidance and role definition to military commanders in the field on OFDA's operations and role to assist the commanders in completing the humanitarian mission and allowing DOD withdraw in the most expeditious manner.
- 2 That as part of the above, the particular actions required to support sensitive "humanitarian interventions" be studied in greater detail, with particular attention to security and security-related initiatives to achieve those interventions peacefully. A range of alternative situations which might be anticipated can be reviewed and integrated into joint operations planning scenarios.

The United States has consistently provided important leadership in worldwide disaster preparedness and response. While the debates continue internationally, we have the opportunity to prepare for future innovations, building on the Iraq experience. Our preparedness may well provide the support needed to successfully lead us through new unique international humanitarian challenges.

I. OFDA JOINT OPERATIONS EXPERIENCE WITH DOD IN KURDISH EMERGENCY

A Background

OFDA has a strong and productive relationship with the DOD through The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Global Affairs. This relationship has been established over several years through numerous joint responses to disasters worldwide. DOD provides support services through its DOD Directive 5100.46 which sets forth criteria and procedures for OFDA support by DOD assets under the direction of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Global Affairs. In brief, OFDA identifies disaster response needs in consultation with the American Ambassador, requests and pays DOD for the transportation or other services rendered, and DOD dedicates the assets necessary to perform the requested services.

This interagency partnership operates on the legal authority of OFDA's humanitarian mandate under Section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act which provides that the President can provide foreign disaster assistance to victims "on such terms and conditions as he may determine" through OFDA "notwithstanding any other provision of this or any other act." However, neither OFDA's enabling legislation nor the DOD directive provide any guidance to meet the requirements dictated by joint operations such as those undertaken by OFDA and the DOD components deployed to execute Operation Provide Comfort for Kurdish refugees and displaced in April 1991.

The authority for joint emergency humanitarian operations involving DOD and other USG agencies comes directly from the office of the President and the National Security Council. Unlike the longstanding working level relationship between OFDA and DOD Global Affairs, which has been tested and refined through operating experience, in the case of interagency joint operations, no directive, legislative mandate, or doctrine has been established. This is the major lesson learned from Operation Provide Comfort.

B Discussion

Military leaders in the field who are responsible for executing national foreign policy objectives in the dynamic and complex environment of disasters involving civilians need the assistance and perspective of experienced disaster relief managers. Similarly, OFDA or other civilian agencies could never have mobilized so much response capability so quickly with the precision demonstrated by EUROM forces within hours of the decision to assist the Kurdish victims in Northern Iraq and Turkey. In brief, after Operation Provide Comfort, important and complementary capabilities of DOD components and OFDA have been identified for use in complex international disaster responses. (Situations are characterized below.)

1. Characteristics of DOD Relief Components

- a Unexcelled capacity for immediate mobilization of major forces to provide combat or humanitarian services to meet operational objectives No other institution in the world can do nearly as much nor as quickly as DOD
- b DOD participation in humanitarian operations is politically acceptable in certain cases Because of the personal and political risks involved, however, deployment of DOD personnel and resources for humanitarian objectives is inappropriate for any conflict situation in which the U S is not already a participant
- c Because they exist to meet security objectives, all DOD operations are designed to be totally self-sustaining and meet any contingency They are therefore extremely effective in a broad range of circumstances However, because they require enormous support, DOD operations are extremely expensive
- d DOD components have experienced and proven leaders who can deploy their forces effectively in field and operational situations In complex international disasters, emergency management and assessment techniques need to be added to the traditional DOD doctrine or conventional command structure
- e DOD has other missions which must compete for funds for humanitarian operations Without proper budgetary arrangements to accommodate the additional costs of unexpected humanitarian operations (i e more money), humanitarian operations will denigrate DOD capacity to meet national security objectives
- f DOD components include specialized organizations that are trained, equipped and experienced in international humanitarian relief efforts, and in civil-military coordination in particular

2 Characteristics of OFDA Relief Components

- a OFDA operates under the authority of an official declaration by the U S Ambassador or the Secretary of State that a disaster has occurred and is beyond the capacity of the government of the affected country
- b OFDA has a statutory mandate and "notwithstanding any other provision of law" authority as the President's central coordinator of U S government foreign disaster assistance under Section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended

- c OFDA has a limited budget, extremely small staff and numerous competing disaster response priorities which inhibit its ability to respond to major disasters with the magnitude of resources that may be required
- d OFDA possesses or has access to "state of the art" skills and experience in assessing the nature and severity of various man-made and natural disasters. These skills also include the ability to identify proven effective interventions to minimize human suffering and other consequences of the emergency
- e OFDA can energize and mobilize the international relief community (i.e. private voluntary and UN/ international organizations) to meet emergent disaster situations. OFDA has the capability to internationalize a disaster response in a way no other USG agency can

C Summary

Future humanitarian responses involving joint operations should take into account the characteristics described above. Operation Provide Comfort reaffirmed the fact that DOD logistical and security assets provide superb fast response resources to meet immediate needs in major humanitarian emergencies. Civil Affairs and Special Forces teams are effective and economic in assessing the opportunity for and conducting interagency coordination in support of larger scale military involvement. However, because commitment of those assets is an extremely costly intervention, their humanitarian assistance operations should be replaced as quickly as possible by full-time humanitarian organizations from the international and private voluntary communities. If the role of DOD is to arrive first with the best capability, the role of OFDA is to expedite the transition from a unilateral government response to a multilateral international one.

Plans for future operations which incorporate this approach will minimize costs of humanitarian response activities which require the special capabilities of DOD assets forces. An institutionalized interagency planning and implementation process does not now exist to do this, however. A dedicated effort will be required to achieve this goal.

II IRAQI/KURDISH HUMANITARIAN EFFORT - CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

A Phase I Stabilizing Displaced Populations in the Mountains

March 31: After failed uprising against Saddam Hussein, hundreds of thousands of Kurds flee northward to mountains bordering Turkey

April 5: President Bush directs U S troops to assist the displaced persons in the mountains along the Turkey/Iraq border

U N Security Council adopts Resolution 688, insisting that Iraq allow humanitarian aid to enter the country

Truckloads of supplies donated by Turkish citizens and the Turkish government are distributed among displaced persons along the border and in others areas in southeastern Turkey

Turkey requires non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to register with the Turkish Government, all incoming relief supplies must be consigned to the Turkish Red Crescent

OFDA assembles Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)

April 6: U S and other Coalition members begin fixed-wing airdrops into the mountains, U S base at Incirlik becomes central logistical hub for U S fixed-wing airdrops and commodities arriving from Europe

April 7: 1500 displaced persons reported to have died to date in the exodus

April 9 U S Secretary of State James Baker visits Cucurka

April 11: DART members arrive in Ankara, one member arrives in Stuttgart to serve as liaison person with EUROM

April 12 Cease-fire agreement is signed between Iraq and U S Armed Forces

CDC estimates that the mortality rate for displaced persons in the mountains stood at 3.3 per day per 10,000 between March 29 and April 12. For the same period, the rate was 10.8 per day per 10,000 for children under five

April 13: DART arrives in Incirlik, one person remains in Ankara to assist Embassy and serve as liaison

April 14: Turkish government offers Coalition Forces site at Silopi, Turkey, near the border with Iraq, as forward operations base U S Military arrives and begins to construct base camp and logistical hub for helicopter deliveries of relief into the mountains

Military relief presence at Silopi and airlift capacity from its base into the mountains increases daily

The U N appeals for \$178 million for emergency operations in Iraq, in addition to an earlier appeal for \$400 million for the displaced persons and refugees in Iran, Turkey, Syria and Jordan The League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS) has appealed for \$8.5 million for Iraqi refugees in Turkey, and \$21.5 million for displaced persons in Iraq

April 15. Medecins sans Frontière (MSF) reports indicate that as many as 80% of the displaced persons at sites along the border have infectious diarrhea

Mid-April First Special Forces and Civil Affairs teams are deployed to the sites in the mountains to help organize distribution of relief and carry out continued needs assessments

April 16: DART goes on first field site inspection, people accompany a military medical support team to the affected sites in the mountains CDC component of DART begins to work closely with military medical personnel, including several trips to the affected area

April 16: President Bush announces that the U S , in cooperation with Great Britain and France, will create security zone in northern Iraq A multinational force of troops will provide protection for the returning refugees, and will stay until the U N is operational in the area

Government of Turkey begins to move most severely affected people from mountain sites along the border to camp at Silopi, Turkey

April 18: DART members arrive in Silopi and establish a command center, one DART member remains in Incirlik to work with the Joint Operations Center (the Combined Task Force (CTF) logistical coordinating body for the relief operation)

April 18. U N Executive Delegate Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan signs agreement with Government of Iraq permitting the U N to provide humanitarian assistance to

displaced persons and returnees in northern Iraq The U N plan calls for the establishment of relief centers in northern Iraq, managed by the U N and NGOs The U N is expected to take over management of the camps run by the multi-national forces within 30 days

April 19: President Bush authorizes \$50 million from DOD resources to be committed for humanitarian relief operations for Iraqi refugees This is in addition to the \$25 million already authorized for the DOD airdrop/airlift operation

April 20: Movement of people into the mountains bordering Turkey has slowed to a trickle An estimated 450,000 Kurds have fled to the border between Turkey and Iraq, and over one million are in Iraq

DART, Civil Affairs Team, and other coalition military staff fly to new site in northern Iraq (Zakho) to assess the site and begin camp construction

April 23: Bush approves an additional \$10,000,000 from Emergency Refugee and Migration Account Truck convoys begin carrying relief supplies overland to mountain camps

April 25 Over thirty countries have contributed over \$652 million towards the relief effort This does not include the value of thousands of tons of in-kind contributions and technical assistance teams sent to Turkey, Iran, and Iraq

April 26: CDC estimates that between April 13 and April 26, death rates among the displaced persons in the mountains were 5.7 for the general population and 20.5 for the under age five population, per 10,000 persons per day Death rates rose during this two week period because the refugees were living under very harsh conditions in the mountains without adequate food, water or shelter

April 28: Incirlik is procuring items and Silopi is targeting deliveries for most affected locations based on needs assessments carried out by the Special Forces' teams in the mountains Silopi military believes relief effort has thus evolved from a supply-driven to a need-driven effort Pressure is mounting to cease airdrops from Incirlik because of the cost, losses, and the effective road and helicopter transport capability that has been established

The U S Military continues to increase shipments of bulk foods to the mountains Generally, the food situation has been stabilized, though water and sanitation is still a major problem

Delivery of Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) from Incirlik has ceased, except for military personnel requirements

B Phase II: Camp Construction in Zakho and Repatriation to Iraq

- April 30:** Kurdish guerrillas block roads, preventing aid and refugees from passing As of April 30, approximately 300 Kurdish workers have been brought to Zakho to work on camp construction and to assess the security situation for themselves Over 750 people have come to the camp on their own steam
- May 1:** 70% of Kurdish returnees are bypassing new tent camps in Zakho and going directly home
- President Bush authorizes the use of up to \$140 million from DOD resources for the relief effort
- May 2:** CDC, UNICEF, and U S military begin vaccination campaign in the mountains
- At meeting with NGOs in Diyarbakir, a handful of agencies expressed interest in working in northern Iraq, but most were reluctant to commit themselves
- U S military begins to move people down from the mountains to the Habur valley
- May 8:** First U N /NGO coordinating meeting in northern Iraq (at U N headquarters in Zakho) International Rescue Committee (IRC) agrees to set up NGO coordinating committee for activities in northern Iraq
- May 9:** CDC estimates that death rates in the mountains for the period April 27 to May 9 were 2.2 for the general population and 8.7 for the under five population, per 10,000 per day (showing a decline in mortality of over 50% since CDC's figures for April 13-26 period, above)
- May 10:** First camp at Zakho is full (about 20,000 people), with people waiting to register outside the camp A second camp is under construction
- May 12:** Iraqi soldiers are preventing some of the returnees from going to Dahuk U S forces complete first way station for refugees returning from mountains (The French have already constructed way stations)
- Security Zone extended to East to include Sursink and Suriya, and south to outskirts of Dahuk

C Phase III: Expanded Repatriation, Resettlement and Transition to a U N -led Effort

- May 13:** U N flag raising at Zakho, indicating "ceremonial" U N take over of camp administration U N convoy with six trucks of relief food goes to Dahuk
- May 15:** The U N issues a revised consolidated appeal calling for \$415 million to support relief operations until the end of August 1991 Aside from \$7 6 million targeted for Kuwait, the rest will go to Iraqi refugees, displaced persons, and returnees As of May 15, over thirty countries have contributed \$714 million toward the relief effort, exclusive of in-kind contributions
- May 19** The first three camps at Zakho are full and planning for the fourth camp has begun (By May 22, a total of 54,700 people are in the Zakho camps) The U S military estimated that 5000 per day are coming to the Zakho area Task Force Alpha (U S Military) continues to move people out of the mountains
- U S military and DART assessment team go to Dahuk
- May 20•** U N police force arrives in Iraq
- Surveys of other potential camp sites in Habur valley, delay over Dahuk
- May 21:** Iraqi General Najwan is attacked during Kurdish riot in Zakho U S MPs protect General Najwan from the irate crowds
- May 23:** U S and Coalition Forces reach agreement with Iraqis permitting group of non-combatant coalition soldiers, NGO representatives, and DART members to go to Dahuk to work on repairs and provide services targeted by the assessment teams that had surveyed the city three days earlier
- May 24:** Officials of the UNHCR and Coalition representatives meet in Diyarbakır to discuss final arrangements for implementing the transition to U N management of the humanitarian assistance programs in northern Iraq There are currently 21,511 military staff from 11 countries participating in the relief effort
- CDC estimates that death rates in the mountain camps for the period May 11 to May 24, fell to 9 per 10,000 per day for the general population and 4 5 per 10,000 per day for the under age five population
- CDC estimates that 6700 people died in the mountains between 3/29/91 and 5/25/91

Continued surveys of population are conducted to determine health situation and food distribution

- May 25:** Contingent of Coalition Forces, NGOs and DART members establish base in Dahuk (12 NGO reps, 5 DART members and approximately 60 Civil Affairs, Military Police, Engineers and other military personnel)
- May 28:** OFDA and US military Civil Affairs negotiate with UN agencies for transfer of responsibilities
- May 31:** In late May, Congress passes a supplemental appropriations bill authorizing an additional \$143 million for the Bureau for Refugee Programs for the Iraqi refugee crisis and other emergencies
- June 2:** Kurdish residents of Dahuk stage a demonstration which turns into a riot at the Iraqi police station. NGOs staying in Dahuk view shooting and fighting from the hotel. NGOs pull out of Dahuk.
- June 3:** Civil Affairs units begin to leave northern Iraq. Army camp near Zakho transit camps used by NGOs, the military and other relief workers is disbanded.
- June 4:** Population in mountain camps has dwindled to almost nothing. Cucurka, the last camp, closes on approximately June 4.
- June 7:** U.S. relief effort in the mountains is over, Task Force Alpha pulls out.
- June 7:** Date for U.N. take over of all U.S. initiated relief projects in northern Iraq, including camps.
- The U.N. has 60 guards stationed in northern Iraq to date, of a total of 500 that will be deployed. The U.N. Secretary General has appealed for \$35 million to pay for the U.N. Guard Force.
- Harvest becomes serious issue.
- Military contingent leaves Dahuk.
- June 31:** ICRC has received \$102 million in response to its appeal for its work in the region.
- July 11:** There are 582 U.N. staff in Iraq, including 271 U.N. guards. UNHCR is the lead U.N. agency in northern Iraq. UNICEF is providing assistance to the health and water infrastructure throughout the country, and is distributing

medicine and conducting immunization campaigns in the Kurdish areas Using World Food Programme food, ICRC is carrying out food distribution in the Penjwin region of northern Iraq ICRC mobile medical teams continue to provide medical services, and food, water and equipment throughout the country

July 13 A U N mission, led by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan completes its assessment of food and health conditions in Iraq and reports that food and medicine are in short supply in Iraq and are hard to obtain for average Iraqis The mission also reports that the essential services are slowly being repaired, although Iraq's infrastructure is still badly damaged

UNICEF estimates that between 50,000 and 80,000 children are at risk due to deteriorating conditions in Iraq A Tufts University assessment mission concludes that Iraq does not face the threat of famine, but that chronic malnutrition among vulnerable groups has been exacerbated by current conditions

July 15: Coalition forces withdraw from Iraq, leaving a small residual force in Turkey near the Iraqi border to monitor Iraqi actions towards the Kurds The Turkish government later becomes uncomfortable with the residual force (Most U S troops are out of the border area by the first week of October)

There are less than 7,000 people still at the refugee camp in Silopi, and an additional 7,000 at the transit camp at Zakho Many of the remaining refugees in Turkey fear political persecution in Iraq because of their involvement with the Kurdish struggle, and are unwilling to return to Iraq

The U N has received pledges for over \$212 million in response to its appeal for \$449 million for operations in Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Kuwait

For final U S Government spending on the humanitarian effort, see OFDA final situation report in Attachment 1

III. REPORT OF THE AID/OFDA-SPONSORED KURDISH AFTER-ACTION WORKSHOP

A Introduction

The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), in cooperation with the Department of Defense (DOD), sponsored a Kurdish After-Action Workshop, in Arlington, Virginia, September 3 - 4, 1991, to identify specific positive accomplishments and issues encountered during the US Government humanitarian response to the Kurdish displaced persons situation. The overall goal of the workshop was to improve the coordination of joint OFDA - DOD operations during complex or massive disaster relief operations in the future, particularly with the OFDA-deployed Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) in the field.

The workshop was attended by 35 participants who were significantly involved in the Kurdish response, including representatives from OFDA, DART members, DOD, Agency for International Development, State Department, USDA/Forest Service, Centers for Disease Control, Water and Sanitation for Health Project (WASH) and Intertect. (See Workshop Participant List, Section III E)

The objectives of the workshop were to

1. Review the activities of OFDA/Washington and the DART to identify positive accomplishments of the DART deployment and operation;
2. Identify priority issues to be resolved to enhance future deployments of DARTs and their coordination with OFDA/Washington;
3. Review the working relationships of OFDA with the DOD during the Kurdish response to identify positive and unique accomplishments of the joint effort,
4. Identify priority issues to be resolved to improve OFDA - DOD cooperation on future joint complex disaster responses, and
5. Develop recommended follow-up action plan to address the issues identified in No. 2 and 4 above.

The workshop served to point out many of the positive accomplishments of this very unique operation and ways to enhance further OFDA - DOD cooperation on humanitarian relief operations of this magnitude. The framework for collaboration of OFDA and DOD on disaster responses needs to be fine tuned and developed into formal working relationships.

that will strengthen U S Government humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed around the globe

B Situation Summary of U S Action

On March 27, 1991, the State Department issued a disaster declaration for Iraq and asked that OFDA provide relief assistance to Iraqi displaced persons. On April 10, OFDA's DART was dispatched to assist in the coordination of Operation Provide Comfort, perform emergency needs assessments and develop a humanitarian response plan.

The initial objectives of the DART team deployment to Turkey/Iraq were

- **To prepare a written assessment on the emergency needs of the Kurdish population along the Turkey/Iraq border and recommend to OFDA/Washington emergency assistance interventions;**
- **To work with DOD, State, PVO's and the UN to prepare a written plan for the transition from a military to a UN run emergency relief operation, the construction and management of the displaced persons camps and the resettlement of the refugees and displaced persons to their traditional places of residence, and**
- **To fund short-term (60 -90 days) emergency relief activities until multilateral assistance is available.**

The two major objectives of the Operation Provide Comfort were to reduce mortality rates among the refugee population and to create conditions enabling the refugees to return home. Both objectives were accomplished with almost all 400,000 refugees who fled to the Turkish border areas returning to their homes in Iraq.

The DART's most important role was the development of the plan, in conjunction with DOD, for the relocation and repatriation of the Kurdish refugees and displaced persons back to their residences. The DART was also instrumental in the preparation of the transition plan for the transfer of the relief and rehabilitation management to the U N and NGO's.

The DART consisted of OFDA representatives, specialists in emergency planning, shelter, sanitation, health, logistics, food procurement, contracting, communications, and various liaison functions. While carrying out its mission the DART worked closely with U S

Embassy officials, U S military and other coalition forces, U N representatives and members of other relief agencies (See attached Situation Report for complete details)

C After-Action Workshop Summary

Positive Actions in the OFDA -DOD Coordination of Kurdish Response

In a joint session with workshop participants from DOD, OFDA, and DART members, the group produced a list of the many positive accomplishments and actions of the joint complex operation in Turkey and Northern Iraq. Some of the major specific accomplishments highlighted at the workshop were the following

- 1 Special Forces (SF) units established order out of chaotic situation in the mountains
Set up the distribution system to the displaced persons camps
- 2 SF was the appropriate unit because of strong organizational and technical skills
Medics, communication, water purification, training with indigenous people (SF did the same in southern Iraq)
- 3 SF organized the kurds to organize themselves
- 4 Common concepts of the problem on part of OFDA and DOD initially
- 5 Press had good access to the disaster sites
- 6 Emphasis on declassifying information wherever possible on site
- 7 High level of commitment of SF stopped a many potential human rights abuses
- 8 Marines had excellent sensitivity to combined relief efforts in creating secure situation
- 9 Security capability of military reassured PVO's working cooperatively with DART and DOD
- 10 Getting DART to the scene in Zakho early in the situation
- 11 Excellent procurement support from military
- 12 SF disseminated information to PVO's whenever appropriate

- 13 Good to excellent logistical support from military to the PVO's
- 14 EUCOM was flexible enough to allow exceptions for transition phase of the operation, e g transporting non-Americans when situation called for it
- 15 DOD sharing of resources among military units and with DART and other support activities Vice Versa-DART shared resources and technical expertise with military when needed
- 16 Military coordinated communication was an excellent idea and prevented many potential problems in N Iraq (e g with the troops, police, officials, etc)
- 17 DOD created "coalition mentality" and showed it wasn't just USA effort through an acceptance of resources
- 18 PVO's that worked cooperatively with the military developed good working relationship with them
- 19 DOD allowed DART excellent access to management, information, and planning in the field, as well as at EUCOM
- 20 DOD commitment to operation established a high credibility with the Kurdish population
- 21 Ability to contract on site by the Army Corps of Engineers was positive aspect for Health/Sanitation component of the DART
- 22 Deployment of Marine Unit became anchor of the DOD activity
- 23 Ability of military to mount large scale logistics operation quickly

The workshop served to point out that despite the complexity of this joint operation it was conducted successfully with the ultimate goals and objectives being obtained The coordination between the OFDA-DART and the US Military, although far from perfect, was mutually beneficial and enhanced the execution of the overall US Government response

Issues identified in the OFDA - DOD Coordination of Kurdish Response

Workshop participants spent several hours identifying major issues that need to be resolved to improve joint complex undertakings of OFDA and DOD. Primary concerns of the group centered on coordination problems in the field, as well as at EUCOM in Stuttgart and Washington headquarters. The group agreed that many of the issues revolved around a general lack of knowledge of each agency's mandate, role in the operation, technical resources and expertise and procedures. It was indicated that many of these issues could be resolved through better communication between OFDA and DOD and the development of formal relations through a memorandum of understanding or some other instrument.

Among the major issues identified in OFDA -DOD coordination during the Kurdish response were the following:

- 1 There is a general lack of understanding of mandates, procedures, and capabilities among OFDA, DOD, and others in humanitarian operations
- 2 Lack of OFDA-DOD planning and coordination at all levels
- 3 DOD lacks much flexibility in non-DOD logistics requests in humanitarian assists
- 4 Need to clearly define NGO-PVO liaison roles/relationships between OFDA and DOD in humanitarian operations
- 5 Coordination/integration of DART-DOD communication hardware on local/regional/international level
- 6 Some NGO's do not want to work with military
- 7 Lack of coordination of incoming relief supplies, needs not identified lead to overkill
- 8 DOD lack of knowledge of what needs to be reported in humanitarian operations
- 9 Appearance of too much emphasis on "tonnage" dropped in relief operation
- 10 Lack of military doctrine regarding humanitarian relief efforts
- 11 Assessment capabilities of OFDA not well understood by DOD
- 12 DOD medical capabilities not appropriate for large scale public health interventions for civilian populations during relief operations

- 13 DOD not prepared to support OFDA, PVO's, NGO's
- 14 Lack of knowledge of local lab facilities for conducting medical evaluations
- 15 Civilian Affairs will not be available under normal humanitarian assistance activities
- 16 DOD lack of knowledge of consular affairs issues/immigration, etc to deal with cross-border situations.
- 17 Lack of shared technical expertise between OFDA-DOD
- 18 DART did not always have access to facilities, locations when needed, DART had no rank or status with military officers on-site
- 19 DART requests had to fit into DOD movement system, lots of high priority items
- 20 DOD procedures are often cumbersome

D Conclusions and Summary of Recommendations

In an assessment of the major issues identified at the workshop, the participants' consensus was that the coordination problems between OFDA and DOD were primarily caused by the uniqueness and complexity of the situation and the mutual lack of understanding of the capabilities, mandate and procedures of both parties. The U S response to the Kurdish situation presented an unique operating arrangement between DOD and OFDA that had not been encountered before. Because of the scope of the operation and the changing objectives, unique issues arose that need to be addressed to facilitate the coordination in similar responses engaging DOD and OFDA.

Based on workshop interactions, the following major recommendations were proposed for enhancing OFDA - DOD joint complex humanitarian operations:

1. Review existing DOD doctrine and directives that affect operational relationships with OFDA in joint humanitarian assistance
2. Develop joint interagency written procedures and doctrine through a memorandum of understanding or other instrument between OFDA and DOD
3. Support to the DOD initiative to develop a Post-Hostilities Annex.
4. Identify legal obstacles to DOD involvement in complex humanitarian emergencies.

- 5. Schedule shared training exercises to enhance knowledge base of OFDA and DOD operational procedures and capabilities.**
- 6. Prior to deployment, identify roles, responsibilities and resource capabilities of DART and DOD personnel agreed to in writing by both parties prior to each joint disaster response.**

The action follow-up to this workshop will require a joint effort of OFDA and DOD to develop the working relationship to support joint complex humanitarian assistance operations. OFDA will take the recommendations from this workshop and assign a working group to set up this cooperative relationship.

An initial step was made at the OFDA Goals and Objectives Workshop held on September 6, 1991. A major objective of OFDA in FY92 will be to negotiate a memorandum of understanding with DOD through the Office of Global Affairs with appropriate DOD components on respective roles of OFDA and DOD in responding to complex international emergencies.

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Attachments

**AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D C.**

**OFFICE OF U S FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE
(OFDA)**


SITUATION REPORT NO 25 (FINAL)*

2 00 p m

July 17, 1991

IRAQ - Displaced Persons/Refugees

* This is the final updated situation report for northern Iraq. Future sitreps will cover the rest of Iraq



Affected Populations See Map Approximately 7,000 Iraqi residual refugees are still living in the camp at Silopi (A) Hundreds of thousands have returned to their homes in northern Iraq (B) The U N High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that approximately 300,000 Iraqi civilians, mostly Kurds and Shutes, remain in Iran (C), large numbers are returning to Iraq daily, and approximately 150,000 are along the border (D) The U N estimates that between 40,000 and 100,000 Iraqi Shutes fled to the marsh area north of Basra (E)

Number Dead Based on an affected population of 400,000 in the mountain refugee camps along the Turkey/Iraq border and death rates calculated at various intervals at several locations, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimates that 6,700 people, mostly children under five, died between March 29 and May 25

Summary of USG Assistance

OFDA contribution	\$15,142,074
RP contribution	\$53,550,000
FFP contribution	\$39,700,000
DOD contribution	\$328,320,000

TOTAL \$436,712,074

General Situation

Turkey/Northern Iraq The two primary objectives of *Operation Provide Comfort* to reduce mortality rates among the refugee population and to create conditions so that the refugees could return to their homes safely, have been accomplished. Almost all the 400,000 refugees who fled to the Turkish border area have now returned to their homes in Iraq Management of relief operations in northern Iraq has been successfully turned over to UNHCR and various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) As of July 9, there were 271 U N Guards in northern Iraq and

the U N hoped to have the rest of the force in place soon Coalition forces completed withdrawal from northern Iraq on July 15, and on July 12 the Turkish Government approved the stationing of a residual force of 3,000 troops as a deterrent against possible Iraqi military attacks on the Kurdish population

Conditions are improving in northern Iraq, as electricity and water supply systems are slowly being restored, the primary health care infrastructure is being reestablished, and the summer harvest of food crops is underway Farmers are using 100,000 grain

bags purchased by OFDA in Turkey to store surplus grain. Meanwhile, World Food Program (WFP) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continue to transport emergency food commodities into northern Iraq and distribute them to vulnerable groups, along with CARE and UNHCR

In Turkey, the remaining Iraqi refugees at the camp at Semdinli have been transferred to the residual camp at Silopi, which now houses less than 7,000 persons. There are approximately 7,000 Iraqi returnees left at the temporary transit camp at Zakhu in northern Iraq. The population of Dohuk is virtually back to what it been before the late March exodus. The U.N. reports that approximately 30,000 Iraqis per week are returning from Iran back into northern Iraq. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is coordinating much of the repatriation of refugees from Turkey and Iran, contracting truck and bus convoys to transport Iraqis from the refugee camps.

Nationwide Iraq On July 13, a U.N.-sponsored mission, led by U.N. Executive Delegate Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, completed its tour of Iraq to assess food shortages and the health crisis reported throughout the country. Although food and medicine are not included in the U.N. sanctions against Iraq, not enough food and medicine is being imported, much of the food and medicine that is available is unaffordable to the average citizen, and the Iraqi government's distribution of supplies has been inequitable. Sanctions still affect Iraq's ability to repair water, sewage, and electrical systems damaged in the war, although essential services are slowly being restored. UNICEF recently reduced its estimates of Iraqi children at-risk from 170,000 to between 50,000 and 80,000, due to the restoration of essential services and international relief efforts. A recent Tufts University assessment mission concluded that Iraq does not face an immediate threat from famine, but chronic malnutrition among traditionally vulnerable groups in Iraq has been exacerbated by the current situation.

Southern Iraq The team of U.N. officials also visited the marsh area north of Basra, where the U.N. estimates that between 40,000 and 100,000 Iraqi Shutes were hiding from the Iraqi military. Prior to the visit, the Iraqi military withdrew its forces that had been firing artillery into the marsh area. On July 11, the U.N. opened a relief center to distribute food and supplies to displaced persons at the village of Hammar, but on July 16 the Iraqi government ordered the U.N. to close the center.

Iran. UNHCR estimates that about 300,000 Iraqi refugees (including approximately 50,000 refugees left from the 1988 exodus) remain in Iran, but that 30,000 are returning per week in the north and between 500 and 1,000 per week are repatriating in the south. The estimated refugee population by province is as follows: W Azerbaijan. 65,100, Kurdistan. 48,000, Bakhtaran 145,000, Khusistan 40,000, Ilam 2,600, Lorestan 3,300.

International Relief Efforts

A pledging conference was held in Geneva on June 12 and was chaired by U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and attended by over 200 representatives from donor governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. As of July 15, the U.N. reports that \$212.2 million has been contributed or pledged to the U.N.'s consolidated appeal for \$448.9 million for urgent humanitarian operations in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Kuwait. The appeal also includes \$35 million to pay for the 500-person U.N. Guard Force deployed in Iraq.

As of July 11, there were 582 U.N. staff in Iraq, including 271 U.N. Guards, and 102 U.N. staff in Iran. As the lead agency for matters related to refugees and returnees, UNHCR is concentrating its activities in northern and eastern Iraq. UNICEF is taking a lead role in providing assistance to the damaged health and water supply infrastructure throughout Iraq, as well as distributing medicines to Kurdish returnees in northern Iraq and mounting a vaccination campaign in Dohuk and other parts of Iraq. In Iraq, WFP has turned over food to ICRC for distribution on its behalf. It has also provided food to populations in Zakhu through crossborder operations from Turkey.

ICRC is carrying out a massive food distribution program in the Penjwin region of northern Iraq, benefiting over 250,000 displaced persons each month. Food distribution programs in different areas are divided among the ICRC, UNHCR, and various NGOs. ICRC mobile medical teams continue to conduct surveys throughout Iraq, providing food, potable water, medicines, equipment, and medical personnel wherever necessary. In Iran, ICRC is scaling down its relief activities as more and more refugees return to Iraq. As of June 31, \$102 million has been contributed to the ICRC's regional appeal.

Among the non-governmental organizations working in northern Iraq are International Rescue Committee, Action Nord Sud, Global Partners, Medecins sans Frontieres, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Medecins

du Monde, Christian Outreach, Save the Children (SCF)/U.K., Northwest Medical Teams, Oxfam/U.K., American Refugee Committee and Med Air

As of July 15, over \$461 million have been reported to be contributed to the U.N., IOM, and ICRC appeals by donor governments and NGOs. In addition, direct bilateral assistance has also been provided by donors, with the U.S., European Community, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy the largest contributors.

Assistance Provided by the U.S. Government (USG)

OFDA Assistance

Grants to International Organizations

On March 27, 1991, the State Department issued a disaster declaration for Iraq and asked that OFDA provide relief assistance to Iraqi displaced persons. OFDA immediately allocated \$869,000 to UNICEF for its program in Iraq to immunize 500,000 children. Another \$131,000 was channeled through ICRC for its relief operations in Iraq.

Technical Assistance

On April 10, OFDA's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) was dispatched to assist in the coordination of *Operation Provide Comfort*, perform emergency needs assessments, and develop a humanitarian response plan. The DART's most important role was to devise a plan, in conjunction with the U.S. military, for the relocation and repatriation of the Kurdish refugees down from the mountain camps and back to Iraq. The DART also developed a transition plan for the transfer of management of relief and rehabilitation activities to the U.N. and NGOs. In addition to OFDA representatives, specialists in emergency planning, shelter, sanitation, health, logistics, food procurement, contracting, communications, and various liaison functions were members of the DART and were stationed at various key locations. The DART worked closely with U.S. Embassy officials, U.S. and other coalition military forces, U.N. representatives, and members of other relief agency teams.

Provision of Stockpiled Relief Commodities

OFDA provided 1,000 tents, 38,000 blankets, 2,000 five-gallon water containers, and 8,640 blankets from its stockpiles to the U.S. Air Force for its airdrop operations over northern Iraq. The commodities, sent aboard DOD transport planes, arrived in Incirlik, Turkey on April 12. An additional 10,000 blankets

and 500 rolls of plastic sheeting (1.3 million sq. ft.) from the OFDA stockpile in Panama arrived on April 14. On May 9, OFDA delivered 875 additional tents and 16 repair kits from its stockpile in Panama to Incirlik. On May 14, 470 tents were airlifted from OFDA's Guam stockpile to Incirlik.

Local Procurement of Relief Supplies

On April 5, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Morton Abramowitz declared a disaster for the influx of Iraqi refugees into Turkey. He used \$25,000 from his Disaster Assistance Authority and was later provided \$250,000 from OFDA and \$2,000,000 from State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs (RP) for local procurement of relief supplies and reimbursement of DOD local purchases of bottled water, baby food, blankets, and clothing. OFDA also provided \$60,000 to the DART to make emergency local purchases of relief supplies. On April 20, OFDA allocated \$5,000,000 to the DART for local procurement of food and needed emergency relief supplies in Turkey and dispatched a food aid expert and two financial officers from USAID/Cairo to Incirlik, Turkey to administer these funds. On May 22 an additional \$5,000,000 was allocated for local procurement of relief supplies.

Emergency Medical Assistance

On April 19, OFDA donated \$40,000 to UNICEF to purchase 500,000 packets of oral rehydration salts (ORS) from the UNIPAC stocks in Copenhagen. On May 6, OFDA provided 100,000 doses of measles vaccine through UNIPAC. Doctors from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and U.S. military distributed ORS packets and administered measles vaccinations in most of the refugee camps. To support the immunization program, OFDA purchased syringes, needles, and cold box ice packs from UNIPAC.

Grants to PVOs for Relief Programs in Northern Iraq

OFDA allocated \$821,340 to CARE to assist in the management of the emergency food distribution program in northern Iraq. In addition, OFDA provided a grant for \$1,336,174 to International Rescue Committee (IRC) to implement a public health and sanitation project in northern Iraq.

Summary of OFDA Assistance

Grant to UNICEF	\$869,000
Grant to ICRC	\$131,000
Grant to CARE	\$821,340
Grant to IRC	\$1,336,174
Ambassador's Authority	\$25,000

Mission allotment for purchase of supplies	\$250,000
Local procurement of relief supplies	\$10,060,000
Purchase of 500,000 ORS packets	\$40,000
Immunization equipment	\$13,500
100,000 doses of measles vaccine	\$13,000
TDY of RP Emergency Operations officer	\$6,140
INTERTECT emergency relief consultants	\$112,244
DART support funds	\$120,000
TDY of financial/contracting support	\$2,936
TDY and travel costs of DART members	\$46,593
Value of tents and repair kits	\$439,385
Value of OFDA stockpile commodities	\$855,762

TOTAL OFDA	\$15,142,074
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Department of State Bureau for Refugee Programs (RP)

Since January, RP has allocated over \$38 million toward various U N appeals for humanitarian assistance in Iraq and neighboring countries. Out of this amount, RP has committed \$24.5 million to UNHCR, \$5 million to the U.N. Guard Force, \$3 million to UNICEF, \$2.75 million to IOM, \$2 million to WFP, \$500,000 to WHO, and \$400,000 to the Office of the U N Executive Delegate.

In addition, RP has allocated to \$12.9 million to the ICRC in response to its April 9 appeal, \$250,000 to the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies for its relief operations in the Abdali camp in Kuwait, and \$2.25 million to Turkish relief organizations.

TOTAL RP	\$53,550,000
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Food for Peace (FFP) Assistance

Between September 1990 and April 1991, FFP sent 29,000 MT of food, valued at \$13.3 million, to the region for the relief effort. These commodities were consigned to World Food Program and the ICRC. Most have already been distributed as part of *Operation Provide Comfort*.

Since April 15, FFP has provided 8,800 MT of food to the region and an additional 12,000 MT is scheduled for delivery in July/August (combined value \$16.2 million). A final commitment of 15,600 MT of food, valued at \$8.3 million, has been approved for September/October delivery. Total FFP contribution of 65,383 MT of food (33,256 MT of wheat flour, 22,180 MT of rice, 5,565 MT of vegetable oil, and 4,383 MT of blended foods) is now valued at \$39.7 million.


TOTAL FFP	\$39,700,000
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Department of Defense Assistance

DOD has revised its preliminary estimate of costs incurred by *Operation Provide Comfort* to \$320 million. This figure will rise following a final accounting. DOD also reports that it donated \$7.32 million worth of excess property (food, tents, etc.) to UNHCR for its humanitarian assistance programs and an additional \$1 million of excess property to the U.N. Guard Force.

TOTAL DOD	\$328,320,000
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TOTAL USG CONTRIBUTION	\$436,712,074
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Andrew S. Natsios

Director

Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance

LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

Size of the Team

While every person on the DART team played a vital role, initially the team was too large and unwieldy. It took some time to sort out the most appropriate role for each staff member and many people were not used in the role that had originally been foreseen. In the future, it would probably be better to send a smaller team and then build when the needs are more clearly defined. A "core" team should include

- 1 a Senior staff member from the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
- 2 an authorized contracts/procurement officer
- 3 experienced disaster management consultants in water and sanitation, food aid
- 4 an experienced public relations/media coordinator
- 5 an experienced CDC epidemiologist (ORS and immunization)

Staff Turnover

A major problem throughout the operation was the short duration of some of the team members. It took two to three weeks for people to get the hang of their assignment, and just as many were becoming thoroughly steeped in the knowledge they needed, their tour of duty expired. In some cases there was sufficient overlap between the original person and their replacement that the learning curve of the second was relatively steep, but in several cases, operations were hampered by lack of continuity.

Communications

The communications system fielded by the Dade County Fire Department proved to be adequate and critical to our operations. The departure, however, of the operators at a critical time created difficulties for the team. It is clear that OFDA must either change the terms of reference for the contractor or acquire the communications equipment in-house.

The hand-held radios were especially critical to coordination of the NGOs. The introduction of this equipment, however, makes NGO operations dependant on their continued use and before the DART team can leave, experience has shown that it must usually turn over the radios to the NGOs and to a qualified operator. This argues for treating the radios as "throw away" items. This means that the system should have two key components

- 1 Cheap, but simple, one or two frequency hand-held radios
- 2 Solar powered, easy to erect relay stations

- 3 Several small generators for recharging the radio batteries (Since most of the countries in which the DART teams are likely to operate use 220 voltage, the recharger units should be automatically regulated within the recharger)

Reporting and Coordination

The inclusion of a staff member to prepare situation reports was a critical timesaver for the team leaders throughout OPC. However, the role of that staffperson was too limited. In the future, the job description should be expanded to include information gathering for team coordination. Anytime that there are more than seven team members operating in the field, the number of reporters should be increased to two, especially if more than one geographical area is being covered. The person's (persons') job would be to actively collect information about the activities of each group within the team, synthesize the information and make sure that other team members receive written reports on what the others are doing. For example, in OPC there were effectively two major teams, one working in the mountains with the refugees along the Turkish border, the other working in Zakho. While information was often shared at the team meetings in Salopi, there were times when it was difficult for both groups to get back to that area and information that would have been vital to exchange was lost. An information officer travelling daily to that area and coming back and preparing written summaries of activities, problems, issues, etc., would have been extremely helpful.

Another coordination mechanism that could have been tried would have been for the team leader to routinely shift back and forth between the two operating areas and holding meetings every other day with each work group, i.e., take the coordination meetings to the teams rather than vice versa.

As in any operation such as this, far too much time was spent in large meetings. Once the majority of activities had switched to Zakho and the majority of the team was based there, coordination became easier and informal coordination became the rule.

While the military coordination meetings at 8:00 and 5:00 provided much helpful information, much of it was redundant and made coordination among the team and with the NGOs more difficult. Since each meeting required setting aside approximately 45 minutes to one hour of time, team leaders often spent up to four hours a day working on coordination meetings. In the future, more of these activities should be integrated.

Funding Capability of DART

The inclusion of a contract officer on DART was important for two reasons. First, it gave AID an ability to develop specific projects for NGOs and fund them immediately. Second, it provided an alternative source for quickly funding high priority items. For example, had it not been for DART's ability to purchase equipment locally, the water system for the refugee camp at Zakho might have been delayed for two to three weeks. If anything, the military procurement system is even more archaic than AID's. Therefore, the inclusion

of a contract officer on every DART mission involving the military is an important consideration

The Problems of Semantics

OPC was not free of the usual problems of AID/OFDA semantics. At a time when the major objective was getting people home, actions that could have accelerated the repatriation and reintegration process, such as economic incentives, assistance with harvest, etc., were often restricted or discouraged from Washington. In extraordinary operations, extraordinary flexibility needs to be granted. What may appear to be "reconstruction" to Washington may be practical or operational necessity at the field level.

OPERATIONAL LESSONS

Humanitarian Intervention

Perhaps the singular, most important lesson of Operation Provide Comfort is that humanitarian intervention can work. Recent emergencies, such as southern Sudan, northern Ethiopia, Angola and others where large numbers of people are trapped by fighting and subjected to human rights abuses by their own government have frustrated the relief community due the inability of relief agencies to gain adequate access to the victims of the conflict. The joint military/humanitarian operation carried out under OPC demonstrated that, in some cases, it will be possible for a superior military force to enter and hold a small security zone and alter the course of the conflict and create humanitarian opportunities that can lead to durable solutions to the problem.

OPC and the Issue of National Sovereignty

In the case of OPC, for the first time in modern history, a refugee problem was nipped as it began to unfold and the burden of the problem was placed squarely on the offending party in the conflict, i.e., the government of Iraq. Had the usual procedures prevailed, the Allies would have put pressure on Turkey to accept the refugees. The refugees would now be condemned to a generation or more of exile. The world might have been faced with a festering insurrection movement that took its frustration out on the international community and Turkey would have been forced to accept an unstable political element in a highly sensitive area. Instead, Iraq was forced to stop killing its own people, withdraw its military forces, restore essential services and permit the people to reintegrate into their communities. Most important, as reintegrated Iraqi citizens living within the borders, the people were re-empowered to deal with the government and the possibility exists that at least a partial or intermediate solution to the Iraq/Kurdish question might be developed.

Application of Resources

The third major lesson of OPC is that when sufficient resources are applied, especially at early stages of an operation, lives can be saved. What made OPC unusual is the rapidity that massive resources were applied. This could only have been done by the military. In no other recent operation have so many logistical resources been available: aircraft, helicopters, trucks, etc. Even in the less visible activities of the operation, such as in water and sanitation, the ability of the military to commit resources far beyond that of most civilian agencies paid off in lives saved. For example, the amount of money spent by the military on latrines in the Zakho camps was more than the entire amount spent by UNHCR for sanitation last year in its world-wide operations. The extremely low diarrhea, morbidity and mortality rates reflected the success that comes when these needs are adequately addressed. In short, OPC shows what you can do when you have adequate resources.

Operational Control

OPC clearly demonstrated the advantage of having operational control as far forward as possible. Throughout the operation, the situation in the field was not clearly understood by higher echelons, especially in Washington. For the DART team, in a natural disaster or one with a lower political profile, the senior OFDA staffer in charge of the program should be able to provide adequate policy input. But for a high-profile operation such as OPC, the Department of State should have fielded a senior high-level official to provide on-site policy guidance. At a minimum, senior personnel from State, National Security Council and AID should have made frequent fact-finding missions to the field. These should have been longer than the one-day in and out visits that typified the infrequent visits that were made.

Relations with NGOs

It was clear from the beginning that non-governmental organizations were reluctant to work in the operation. They especially feared being made pawns in American political policy and were fearful of the consequences of too close an association with the Coalition forces. DART played an invaluable role by providing an intermediary link between the military and the civilian agencies. In any future operation involving the military, it should be SOP to send a DART team.

Assigning Helicopters to DART

As soon as the majority of the DART team had moved to Salopi, the military assigned two helicopters to the team. One helicopter was used almost exclusively by DART to carry out reconnaissance missions and to deploy CDC team members in the refuges. The purpose of the second was to support NGOs working there. The assignment of those helicopters to DART was extremely beneficial. Not only did it give us mobility, NGOs constantly sought us out in order to move personnel, equipment and assessment teams into the mountain zones. This enabled us to coordinate their activities and later to encourage them to join us in Zakho. Transportation was an early key to coordination.

Preparation of the Transition Plan

It was clear that when the United States proposed that the United Nations take over many of the humanitarian operations in Iraq, that UN staff were reluctant to do so because they didn't know what it might involve. The preparation of a written transition plan that laid out all the operations and identified the prerequisite actions that had to be completed before the transition could be effected helped speed up their acceptance of the operation. It was only after this plan was presented and the UN learned how much progress had already been made that they agreed to assume responsibility for most of the activities. In the future, the DART team should be mindful of the need to develop operations plans (similar to those employed by the military) and prepare written guidance for changes in an operation's leadership.

United Nations Response Time

It took the United Nations almost one month before it fully deployed and began to make realistic inputs into the operation in either the mountain encampments or the security zone. The two reasons why they were late in arriving are

- 1 overcommitment in other areas, and
- 2 a built-in reluctance to intervene in a member state's sovereign territory

The lesson for the US is that these operations will always experience a lag time between the start of an operation and the deployment of sufficient UN resources to permit them to take over. In the future, humanitarian operations should be structured in such a way that the transition can be simplified. For example, the military force could be configured like a United Nations peace-keeping force. Humanitarian operations should be more closely aligned to the structure of the UNHCR field operations. By doing so, United Nations personnel can transition into individual slots as they become available and the UN will not be faced with having to accept a total package at the time that the operation is ceded to them.

Design of a Peace-keeping Force Structure

The operations in both northern Iraq and in southern Iraq showed a great deal of ineptitude in the design of a peace-keeping force structure to meet the needs of both the population and the political situation. It is evident that senior State Department/NSC officials do not have the requisite knowledge on the different types of peace-keeping forces, the operational limitations on each, nor how they should be configured to meet the needs of a specific situation. It is likely that in the post-cold war environment, there will be additional demands for peace-keeping forces, not only to replace allied or US forces in operations similar to OPC, but in other places throughout the Third World (such as Liberia, Mozambique, Angola, etc.). The State Department and the Department of Defense should establish a focal point for organizing and planning the deployments of peace-keeping forces so that the Standing Military Committee of the UN can receive adequate inputs from the United States government. One place where this focal point could be centered would be the Office of Humanitarian Affairs in DOD.

The Role of the MCC

The Military Coordination Committee (MCC) was established to coordinate military affairs with the Iraqi government during OPC. Negotiators from the Potsdam team were brought in to handle day-to-day contacts between the Iraqis and Coalition forces. The contact proved to be extremely useful and helped resolve many issues before they became major incidents.

It would have been helpful if a State Department or AID official had been included on the MCC to relate to senior Iraqi civil servants. (The MCC, however, was always open to

including members of the DART team in the necessary discussions and did provide much needed access to the Iraqi government. This link should be formalized in future operations.)

OPC Demonstrations

The operations in northern Iraq illustrated a number of points that have been brought out in recent research. They are:

1. Most refugees live within a very short distance of the border. In the case of OPC, the majority of refugees lived within a 2 to 2½ hour drive by car from the border encampments. Virtually all the refugees within the security zone came from three locations: Zakho, Dahouk and the Sircink-El Amadiya area. The lesson for future interventions is that it is easy to quickly identify where the people came from and design the security zone to permit their repatriation.

2. The Priority of Sanitation

For years, refugee camp planners and public health officials have argued for more funds for close in private sanitation for families in refugee camps. However, international agencies continue to ignore this high priority item. The result is high diarrhea and dehydration rates which lead to higher infant mortality. The individual family latrines used in OPC proved to be a major factor in reducing diarrhea rates once refugees got to the camp in Zakho.

3. The Value of Oral Rehydration

Oral Rehydration Solutions (ORS) again proved to be of high value in the emergency medical program. In the past, ORS had proven effective in hot, desert and tropical climates, but its usefulness had been questioned for cooler areas. The drop in infant mortality that occurred when ORS was finally brought into the area in sufficient quantities demonstrated its effectiveness in colder mountain climates as well.

The Role of the Military

The US Military and Coalition forces demonstrated their ability to project force and react quickly in the humanitarian intervention. Only a few military forces have such capability. Given the fact that humanitarian needs are often acute and can develop extremely quickly, there is a clear need to marry the military's quick reaction capabilities with civilian agencies' skills and expertise in specialized humanitarian services.

The military proved most effective in its traditional roles: logistics, deployment of personnel and security. The use of military police to patrol the cities in the security zone was also noteworthy.

The military proved ineffective in providing emergency medicine for refugees, assistance for reconstruction, organizing or assisting the harvest and in supporting economic reconstruction activities

It is clear that in similar situations, the military will be on the scene much quicker than many of the NGOs. Therefore, their marginal performance in certain fields in the early period needs to be improved. This can be done by providing training in emergency medicine and medical and public health doctrines, refugee camp planning, etc. This training could be provided by The Centers for Disease Control and through a training program established jointly with OFDA.

It is also clear that the military was most effective in the earlier stages than in the intermediate and longer term activities. By coincidence, the NGOs tended to be less effective in the earlier stages and more effective in the later period. Given the fact that the military is most likely to be first on the scene, this provides some guidance as to where emphasis on training should be placed (i.e., the first stage of the emergency, which is approximately 30 days).

Size of the Security Zone

OPC demonstrated that intervention can be limited territorially. The area secured by the Coalition forces represented approximately one sixth of the total area occupied by Kurds. Yet, the activities within the security zone greatly effected actions outside the area in both Kurdistan and in the adjacent areas. For example, when the Iraqi Army was instructed to refrain from assuming an offensive posture near the Allied Forces, the Iraqis ceased their offensive operations throughout Kurdistan. In part, this is because they didn't know which areas we might include in the security zone, but they also obviously feared provoking an incident which would draw us further than the area that we had already secured.

Once the Iraqi Army had ceased offensive operations, it became possible for large numbers of refugees outside the security zone to return to their homes. Within ten days after the repatriation began from the Turkish border, hundreds of thousands of people began moving back into Iraq from Iran and many people who had been displaced in Kurdistan returned to their homes in Sulumania and Erbil.

The lesson is that intervention does not necessarily require taking a large zone in order to have a positive effect on a broader area.

Repatriation

Operation Provide Comfort demonstrated that most refugees will be from a definable geographic area usually located near the border. Therefore, it is only necessary to determine the "catchment" area and establish the security zone in that zone in order to stimulate repatriation. Once repatriation begins in that security zone, it will influence and stimulate repatriation activities in adjacent areas. Once repatriation began in the allied security zone, repatriation to the areas eastward soon followed.

Control of Human Rights Abuses

Operation Provide Comfort demonstrated that human rights abuses carried out by the secret police can be effectively controlled by an intervening force. The key to controlling the secret police is controlling the army. If the army is forced out of the area, the secret police begin to lose their base of support and suddenly become very vulnerable. In such a situation, the authorities are likely to comply with instructions given by the occupying force and a bold commander can often get away with restricting the activities of the normal police, and sometimes the secret police, simply because the local police authorities do not have clear instructions from their superiors. For example, in OPC, the US Forces demanded a list of all persons who were permitted to carry weapons on the pretext of preventing an incident from occurring. As soon as the list was obtained, it was published, raising the anxiety of the secret police and effectively taking away their secrecy. Within a matter of hours, most had left the area. The lesson is clear. The more that you publicize the secret police and take away their secrecy, the less they can operate, and most will voluntarily leave the area. Those remaining can quickly be identified by the local people and isolated.

Procedural Matters

The humanitarian intervention was successful largely because of the way in which it was carried out. Among the more important lessons were

- 1 The importance of sending clear, concise and firm instructions to the military authorities of the offending country
- 2 Establishment of repetitive behavior and procedures. OPC was so effective in this that the Iraqis often withdrew from positions when A-10's began operating in their area, since they knew that this was the precursor to a demarche on that particular zone.
- 3 Establishment of a formal channel for presenting demarches and for daily contacts with the host country forces. The designation of General Shalichashveli as the focal point for all demarches and the MCC for handling all routine contacts proved to be an effective way to deal with the Iraqis.

- 4 Threatening to expand the security zone is an effective means for controlling the host country's behavior in areas outside of the intervening force's zone of control. It was clear that the Iraqis did not want us to expand the security zone any farther than necessary and ceased military operations in adjacent areas so as not to give us any cause to expand the zone.

COMPARATIVE STATISTICS

	OPC	Thai Border	Sudan	Salv.
MORTALITY				
Total Deaths	3,500	4,000	55,000	5,000
Peak Rate (p 10K per day)	5.2	7.2	14.1	3.5
Time at Peak Rate	3 days	6 days	22 days	-
Time above 5	7 days	13 days	70 days	-
Time above 2	11 days	30 days	168 days	58 days
Time above norm	22 days	63 days	329 days	120 days
DIARRHEA				
Total clinical cases	3,600	7,500	36,000	10,000
Peak rate (est. by ORS)	32%	36%	49%	21%
Time at peak rate	2 weeks	4 weeks	19 weeks	52 weeks
Time above norm	8 weeks	52 weeks	52 weeks	52 weeks
NUTRITIONAL STATUS				
Peak percent below 13.5	22%	46%	56%	34%
Peak percent below 12.5	4%	22%	28%	10%
Ave. Time at peak	2 weeks	7 weeks	11 weeks	-
Time to return to normal	5 weeks	9 weeks	57 weeks	-
REPATRIATION RATES				
Time to first signif. returns	3 weeks	9 weeks	12 weeks	7 yrs
Time to complete repatriation	7 weeks	11 yrs	3 yrs	9 yrs

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE

SUBJECT Foreign Disaster Relief

I. APPLICABILITY

The provisions of this Directive apply to all components of the Executive Branch which are directly or indirectly responsible to the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense agencies, and the Unified and Specified Commands (herein referred to collectively as "DOD Components").

II DEFINITIONS

A "Department of State". All components of the Executive Branch which are directly or indirectly responsible to the Secretary of State including, but not limited to, the regional and functional bureaus of the Department of State, agencies such as the Agency for International Development, and State Department offices such as the Bureau for Refugee Programs.

B "Foreign disaster relief". Prompt aid which can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. (Normally, it includes humanitarian services and transportation the provision of food, clothing, medicines, beds and bedding, temporary shelter and housing, the furnishing of medical material, medical and technical personnel, and making repairs to essential services.)

C "Foreign disaster". An act of nature (such as a flood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or epidemic) or an act of man (such as riot, violence, civil strife, explosion, fire, or epidemic) which is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant United States' foreign disaster relief to a foreign country or foreign disaster relief to a foreign country or to an international organization.

III POLICY

A. It is the policy that DOD Components will participate in foreign disaster relief operations only after a determination is made by the Department of State that foreign disaster relief shall be provided. The Department of State will then send a request to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) which indicates (1) the country(s), international organizations and/or individuals to be assisted, (2) the form of assistance requested, (3) the types and

amounts of material and services requested; (4) the amount of funds allocated to the Department of Defense accompanied by symbols showing the chargeable appropriation, allotment, and obligation accounts; and (5) such other information as is needed to permit effective participation by DOD Components in a foreign disaster relief operation.

B. Subject to overriding military mission requirements, the Department of Defense, as appropriate, will respond rapidly to Department of State requests as outlined in subsection IV.A.

C. Nothing in this Directive should be construed as preventing a military commander at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster from undertaking prompt relief operations when time is of the essence and when humanitarian considerations make it advisable to do so. The commander should report at once the action taken and request guidance in accordance with the provisions of this Directive

IV RESPONSIBILITIES

A. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA))) is responsible for

1. Determining the action which the Defense Department shall take in response to State Department requests to the Department of Defense for foreign disaster relief

2. Informing the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Military Departments, and other DOD Components, as appropriate, that funds have been allocated by the Department of State for participation by DOD Components in a particular foreign disaster relief operation.

3. Developing policies and procedures in conjunction with other agencies for use within the Department of Defense for participation in foreign disaster relief operations and assessing the overall effectiveness of these policies and procedures.

4. Initiating action upon request by the Department of State to acquire information regarding the capability and estimated cost of proposed DOD participation in a foreign disaster relief operation.

5. Informing the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) of the contemplated use of funds or resources for foreign disaster relief operations.

6. Designating a DOD Coordinator for Foreign Disaster Relief who shall

- a. Serve as the DOD point of contact with the Department of State and other agencies involved in foreign disaster relief.

- b. Coordinate DOD matters relating to foreign disaster relief operations.

- c. Monitor each foreign disaster relief operation to ensure effective liaison and coordination between DOD Components and the

Department of State and other agencies involved.

d Obtain timely information from State Department officials during specific foreign disaster relief operations, particularly with respect to funds allocated by them for reimbursement to DOD Components for foreign disaster relief costs.

e. Subject to policy control, act for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on other matters relating to foreign disaster relief.

B. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) is responsible for developing, coordinating, and transmitting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, Unified and Specified Commands, and other DOD Components, policy guidance for public affairs activities in connection with foreign disaster relief

C. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for.

1 Upon receipt of a request and funding authorization from the ASD(ISA), directing foreign disaster relief operations by appropriate DOD Components.

2. Providing the DOD Coordinator for Foreign Disaster Relief (a) copies of implementing instructions, (b) periodic situation reports which include an estimate of cumulative costs incurred, a description of DOD activities underway, an indication of significant problems encountered, and other pertinent information, (c) an after-action assessment which includes lessons-learned and recommendations to improve subsequent foreign disaster relief operations, and (d) other pertinent information concerning on-going disaster relief operations.

3. Developing in coordination with appropriate DOD Components and transmitting to unified and specified commanders instructions concerning the planning for the conduct of operations they may be expected to perform in the event of a foreign disaster.

4 Making arrangements to ensure that the DOD Coordinator for Foreign Disaster Relief is promptly informed of the location and extent of foreign disasters which may require foreign disaster relief.

5. Providing information concerning military capabilities to render assistance in a specific foreign disaster and the estimated costs of such assistance.

D Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands are responsible for

1 Conducting foreign disaster relief operations as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or high authority.

2. Keeping the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed as to details involving actual participation in foreign disaster relief operations

E The Military Departments are responsible for

1. Participation as requested by the ASD(ISA) or the JCS in specific foreign disaster relief operations.

2. Processing bills and vouchers for reimbursement in accordance with section VII.

F. Other DOD Components are responsible for providing information and assistance as requested by the ASD(ISA) or the JCS.

B. Upon receipt of an appropriate request from the ASD(ISA) or the JCS, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) shall make available such of its resources for foreign disaster relief operations for overriding civil defense needs

V. POINTS OF CONTACT

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Comptroller), (Health and Environment), (Installations and Logistics), (Intelligence), (Legislative Affairs), (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), (Public Affairs), the DOD General Counsel; the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Director, Joint Staff, the Director, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director, Defense Supply Agency, the Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems, and, other affected DOD Components shall each designate a single point of contact for foreign disaster relief matters and will advise the DOD Coordinator for Foreign Disaster Relief of the name/organization, duty hour and offduty hour phone number of the point of contact. To facilitate rapid DOD response to requests for foreign disaster relief, each point of contact shall give priority attention to requests for information or assistance on foreign disaster relief matters. This function shall be performed within existing personnel ceilings.

VI REIMBURSEMENT

A. Bills and vouchers shall be processed by the Military Departments and forwarded as requested by the DOD Coordinator for Foreign Disaster Relief who will arrange to have them aggregated and forwarded to the Department of State for payment.

B. When preparing billings for reimbursement of costs incurred, the following guidelines apply

1. Materials, supplies and equipment from stock will be priced at standard prices used for issues to Department of Defense activities, plus accessorial costs for packing, crating, handling, and transportation.

2. Materials, supplies and equipment determined to be excess to the Department of Defense will be available for transfer to the Department of State without reimbursement, in accordance with established DOD policies. Accessorial charges for packing, crating, handling, and transportation will be added where applicable.

3. Air and ocean transportation services performed by the Military Airlift Command (MAC) and the Military Sealift Command (MSC) will be priced, where applicable, at current tariff rates for DOD Components. Where tariff rates are not applicable, air transportation, whether provided by MAC or other aircraft, will be priced at the "Common-User Flying-Hour" rate for each type of aircraft involved and ocean transportation provided by MSG will be priced at "Ship Per Diem Rates."

4. Services provided by activities under DOD Industrial Funds other than MAC and MSC will be priced to recover direct and indirect costs applicable to reimbursements for services rendered to other Department of Defense activities.

5. Personal services furnished will be priced at rates to recover (a) actual salaries of civilian personnel plus the prescribed DOD percentage factor to cover holidays, leave, and other fringe benefits, and (b) actual per diem, travel, and subsistence expenses for both civilian and military personnel.

6. All other salaries furnished, not specifically covered above, shall be priced on a mutually agreeable basis and, if feasible, such prices shall be established prior to the services being furnished. Prices for such services shall be at the same rates that the Department of Defense would charge other Government agencies for similar or like services if such rates are available, otherwise the basis of pricing will be to effect full reimbursement of the Department of Defense appropriations for "out-of-pocket" expenses.

VII. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

This Directive is effective immediately. Two copies of the implementing instructions shall be forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) within 90 days.

DISASTER ASSISTANCE RESPONSE TEAM (DART)

The Office of U S Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has the responsibility to coordinate the U S Government's response to disasters abroad. It coordinates this response with that of international agencies, other donor governments, and private voluntary organizations. This authority to provide foreign disaster relief comes from the Foreign Assistance Act which provides for assistance:

- 1 To preserve life and minimize suffering by providing sufficient warning of natural events which cause disasters
- 2 To foster self-sufficiency among disaster-prone nations by helping them achieve some measure of preparedness
- 3 To alleviate suffering by providing rapid, appropriate response to requests for aid
- 4 To enhance recovery through rehabilitation programs

OFDA has developed a capability called the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) as one method of providing the rapid response assistance identified in the Foreign Assistance Act. The DART provides specialists trained in different types of disaster relief capabilities to USAID/Embassies and affected countries to assist them in managing the effects of disasters. The DART is organized in five functional areas: management, planning, operations, logistics, and administration in order to be able to respond to any type of disaster. The structure of a DART is dependent on the size, complexity, type and location of the disaster, and the needs of the USAID/Embassy and the affected country. The number of members assigned to a DART is determined by how many individuals are required to perform the functions to meet the objectives. A DART uses a management by objective system so that all team members know and understand the objectives of the operation.

The Team Leader of a DART receives a delegation of authority from the Director of OFDA which explains the objectives, priorities, constraints, and reporting requirements of the DART. Upon arrival in an affected country, the Team Leader will report to the senior U S official in the country or at the disaster, or to the most appropriate senior affected country official to discuss the DART's objectives and anticipated level of response and to receive additional instructions and/or authority. While in the affected country, the Team Leader will receive periodic instructions from the senior designated USAID/Embassy official. Those instructions will be followed to the extent they do not conflict with OFDA policies, authorities, and procedures. The Team Leader will maintain a direct line of communications with OFDA Washington.

The decisions on a DART's activation, composition, and mission are made at the initial disaster response planning meeting held in OFDA. This meeting will take place if a disaster is imminent or as soon as possible after a disaster has occurred. The following are factors that are considered during the decision making process:

- 1 What is the type and magnitude of the disaster, where is it located in relationship to heavily populated areas, and what is the likelihood of mass death and injuries?
- 2 What are the effects of the disaster on the USAID/Embassy which could reduce their capability to manage the situation?
- 3 What is the availability and experience of USAID/Embassy personnel and of the affected government to adequately manage this type and magnitude of disaster?

- 4 What are the political consequences of not having OFDA field representation
- 5 What is the size and type of disaster relief being provided by other countries in response to international appeals from the affected country?
- 6 What are the congressional pressures being applied due to appeals from ethnic groups located in various political jurisdictions?
- 7 Has OFDA responded to this type of disaster in the past? If so, what are the lessons learned from that response? And does OFDA have the capability to respond now?
- 8 Is there any pre-planned OFDA commitment with the USAID/Embassy or the affected country to send a DART based on pre-determined circumstances?
- 9 Has there been a request for assistance from the Ambassador?
- 10 If there is a direct request, does it seem appropriate, reasonable, or accurate? Is clarification necessary?

If after reviewing the above factors, the decision is made to activate and deploy a DART, the following actions are taken by OFDA

- 1 The objectives, functions, priorities, and constraints of the DART are defined
- 2 The team configuration and size is decided, based on the functions needed to meet the objectives
- 3 A Team Leader is identified and he/she assists in selecting team members
- 4 Selected team members are contacted using call-out procedures, and their availability is confirmed
- 5 OFDA prepares general and specific briefings on the situation, response objectives, strategies, priorities, and reporting requirements for the DART. The briefings are conducted in OFDA Washington or the information is sent to the point of departure
- 6 OFDA secures transportation for the DART
- 7 The USAID/Embassy in the affected country is notified of the DART deployment, its objectives, functions, priorities, constraints, and its estimated time of arrival
- 8 The DART departs for the affected country

New ways to run the world

"WE, THE peoples" If those words lack the familiarity of the ones in the American constitution that inspired them, it is not because the phrase is new. It is because, for more than 40 long years, "We, the peoples" has been a phrase frustrated. Now, after the collapse of communism and the end of the cold war, the opening words of the United Nations charter are coming out of their refrigerated irrelevancy. For the first time the nations of the world, rich and poor, are beginning to co-operate for agreed ends on a scale that hitherto only idealists have even dreamed about.

This is not simply a UN phenomenon. True, the UN is involved in much of the multinational activity: quarantining Iraq, holding the ring in El Salvador, reintroducing Cambodia to peace. In its first 40 years the UN undertook 13 peace-keeping operations, since East and West shook hands three years ago it has embarked on eight. With the Soviet veto gone and the Chinese one in suspension, the UN Security Council is at last beginning to act as intended to keep the international peace and promote economic development. But the new cross-frontier interference goes well beyond the UN's activities.

A few examples show the extent of the phenomenon. In Zambia an election, the first multi-party one for more than 20 years, has just been held under the eye of observers organised by the Commonwealth and Jimmy Carter's Atlantan monitors. In India the government is unravelling one of the world's most regulated economies under the tutelage of the International Monetary Fund. The Fund is also engaged, with institutions like the World Bank, in the creation of market economies in Eastern Europe and in the reform of dozens of others in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Peace-makers in Africa range from the UN in Western Sahara and Angola, to the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia, to the religious community of St Egidio in Mozambique. The soldiers running post-coup Haiti are being chided by the Organisation of American States. The Soviet Union has turned to the rich world's Group of Seven to help sort out its economy.

Rejoice. To democrats, devotees of market economics and believers in human rights, all these efforts must be good news. That is certainly the way they are received by many people in the countries concerned, at least for a time. For though the values and disciplines now being cemented in place across the world are the ones by which western democracies have long tried to live, they are far from unwelcome elsewhere.

Of course the African despots who are losing office regret the advent of unrigged elections, the voters do not. The Khmers Rouges may lament the prospect of peace in Cambodia, but most Cambodians delight in it. Even those who are bearing the brunt of an IMF austerity plan often do so willingly, knowing



that the alternative—autarky, central planning, communism—is worse. Eastern Europe is for the most part making its transition to the market with gritted teeth rather than sharpened sword. And Latin America is sweating under IMF rigours not because the Wes has imposed something on Latin Americans but because Latin Americans themselves, after years of trying other remedies, have come to think that market economics offers the least bad way of managing their affairs.

Still, the vogue for democracy and capitalism may not always be popular. Zambians may welcome an internationally monitored election that gets rid of an old autocrat and yet find an IMF programme that doubles the price of food hard to take. Will they then turn on the well-shod men from the Fund and berate them for neo-colonialism?

If they do, the Fund has an easy answer: ask us to depart and we shall do so, taking our money with us. In setting conditions on borrowing countries, the IMF and similar organisations are, after all, doing no more than any bank does when lending money to a private customer. If sovereignty is infringed, the infringement is accepted and can be ended at will.

The modern multinational Moses

Not all infringements, however, are so straightforward. "We, the peoples" are increasingly concerned not just to see countries well governed but also to ensure that the world is not irreparably damaged—whether by global warming, by the loss of species, by famine or by war. When an international body with an unfamiliar set of initials pops up and says to Brazil, "Thou shalt not cut down thy rain forest", to Zimbabwe "Thou shalt not cull thy elephants", or to Pakistan "Thou shalt not develop thy nuclear bomb," reasonable people in those countries may say, "What business is this of yours?"

For years that question has been enough to make interferences pull back. No longer. Saddam Hussein has shown why the rest of the world has an interest in restraining countries from developing weapons of mass destruction. Increasingly, world opinion, when confronted by television pictures of genocide or starvation, is unimpressed by those who say, "We cannot get involved. National sovereignty must be respected." National sovereignty be damned: the UN is already involved in Iraq. It, or the European Community, might similarly be involved in saving Yugoslavs from themselves if wise heads, seeing no way out, did not counsel caution. Should outsiders sit on their hands if a new Ethiopian tyrant were deliberately to starve a few million of his countrymen? Many say no.

The two areas in which the new commandments—the thou-shalt-nots—are likely to grow are defence and the environment. The IMF and World Bank may well refuse, as they are increas-

Long-term causes, short-term preoccupations. This recovery may be unusually limp, but American economic history is repeating itself nonetheless. While the administration and the Fed flap over each new set of figures, the demands of long-term stability continue to go unheeded—which makes the next flap inevitable. The already inadequate budget accord looks ready to collapse, a comprehensive reform of bank regulation, so long overdue, died in the House of Representatives on November 5th and will be replaced, at best, by yet another stop-gap.

This acute uncertainty over economic policy makes it unsurprising that business and consumer confidence—the most powerful engines of every recovery—are stuck at levels better suited to mid-recession. Recently the White House may itself have braked the expansion, merely by exaggerating at every opportunity the dreadful consequences of failing to cut interest rates. That is a bad way to run monetary policy, to be sure. As even short-termists ought to see, it is also a good way to persuade firms and consumers to stop a recovery in its tracks.

Land for peace



The idea is still alive

THE old jibe against the Palestinians is that they never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. In Madrid last week they saw a chance, sank their teeth into it, and showed no signs of letting it go (see page 40). For the first time in a long time the Arabs of Palestine are speaking for themselves—to the Americans, to the Israelis and, with skill and dignity, to the wider world. As a result, they may now be within just a few years of acquiring a state, or something like it. Israel's Likud government, in contrast, may be about to abandon everything it once stood for, and so, almost by accident, to bring a long-overdue peace to the Israeli people.

These are big claims to make after one largely ceremonial meeting. But the peace conference in Madrid merely put an official seal on three changes that had already up-ended the Middle East. Two of these were the Gulf war and the collapse of the cold war, both of which loosened the relationship between the United States and Israel. The third was the decision of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, back in 1988, to agree to partition Palestine between a Jewish state and an Arab state—the peace proposal put forward by Britain's Peel commission in 1937, by the United Nations in 1947 and, implicitly, by Security Council Resolution 242 in 1967.

At different times both Jews and Arabs have claimed the whole area between the Jordan river and the Mediterranean for themselves. Outsiders have argued for partition. But when the Jews were willing to accept partition (from the late 1930s to the late 1970s), the Arabs were not, and by the time the Arabs decided to accept partition (in 1988), the Jews had changed their minds. The formal position of the PLO, faithfully represented by the Palestinian delegation in Madrid, is now to give Israel permanent control of more than half of Palestine (the pre-1967 borders), provided Israel gives up the rest.

The Likud Party still says that Israel is the rightful owner of the whole of Palestine, and its leadership's attachment to Greater Israel goes far too deep to be uprooted by goodwill or sweet reason alone. That is why it is a mistake to read too much into the cordial handshakes the Israelis and Palestinians exchanged at their first bilateral meeting in Madrid. What really matters is that the Palestinians are now a lot closer than the Israelis are to the policy of the United States.

George Bush has not endorsed either the Palestinian demand for full statehood or the general Arab demand for Israel to quit every inch of land it occupied in 1967. This is where the bargaining will be done. But ever since 1967 the Americans

have repeated like a gramophone record their support of the principle of exchanging land for peace, their refusal to acknowledge Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem, and their opposition to the building of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. The cold war sometimes drowned out this scratching in the background, but the record itself never changed. Now that the cold war is over, Mr Bush has signalled that he does indeed intend to bring about some form of partition.

Will it play in Petah Tikva?

Yitzhak Shamir is probably the least flexible prime minister Israel has ever had. To go along with partition would be to fly in the face of the main thing his party stands for: an undivided Israel in its complete biblical home. But Israelis are more pragmatic than many outsiders believe, if only because the tiny size of their country and economy gives them little choice. If the relationship with the United States is truly in jeopardy—and Mr Bush's withholding of \$10 billion in loan guarantees suggests that it may be—most Israelis are likely to feel that they have no alternative but to acquiesce. In Madrid, interestingly, Mr Shamir refrained from uttering the "not an inch" principle he enunciates so often at home. Many Likud supporters and, privately, even some members of Mr Shamir's cabinet are beginning to admit that Israel may have to give up some land in return for a reliable peace.

Luckily for Mr Shamir, the peace policy adopted by America does not envisage redrawing borders instantaneously. Talk about the borders of the West Bank and Gaza, as about other "final status" questions, is to be postponed until 1995, by which time the Israelis are supposed to have given the Palestinians a form of self-government. By then the Likud may have won another general election, because most Israelis would prefer to negotiate a fighting retreat under the granite-hard Mr Shamir than a cave-in under Labour's wobbly Shimon Peres.

Hardline Likudniks undoubtedly hope that by 1995 many other things will have changed. The Americans may have rediscovered their loyalty to Israel, or simply lost interest, or the Arabs may have found a new way to blacken their own case. By its sour antics in Madrid, and by refusing to attend multilateral talks, Syria is already in danger of doing just that. But, after Madrid, the Syrians can no longer claim to speak on behalf of the Palestinians, or even in tune with them. For the present, and at long last, the trend is towards peace.

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Disaster Relief Proposal Worries Third World

By PAUL LEWIS

UNITED NATIONS, Nov. 12 — A Western proposal that the United Nations appoint a senior official with \$50 million in ready cash at his disposal to coordinate the world's response in floods, famines and other natural disasters is provoking debate at this year's General Assembly, where developing countries fear it could give foreigners a pretext for meddling in their internal political affairs.

The plan for a disaster relief coordinator was first proposed by the European Community this year and endorsed by the United States and Canada

in July at the summit meeting of the Group of Seven industrialized democracies.

It reflects a widespread view among these countries, which provide most of the world's disaster aid, that United Nations and other relief agencies performed poorly during the Kurdish crisis in Iraq and in recent emergencies in Bangladesh and the Horn of Africa.

Over the last 20 years more than three million people have been killed by natural disasters and some 800 million made homeless, more than 90 percent of them in the world's poorest countries.

In a new study of existing arrange-

ments for dealing with emergencies Sir Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, former senior United Nations officials, drew a picture of a capricious rivalry torn mechanism that they described as "less the product of logic than historical accumulation."

"Far too often thousands who are starving and uprooted in one part of the world receive the bare minimum of relief and succor, while aid pours forth for those who are suffering at a focus of international power politics and media attention," they concluded.

A single high level aid coordinator could be expected to reduce this disparity and would also be well placed to

prevent the kind of political abuse of emergency relief that has occurred in many developing countries in recent years.

The Governments of war-torn Ethiopia, the Sudan and Iraq have all sought to use foreign aid as a weapon with holding supplies from those they consider disloyal but lavishing them on friends.

The idea that the world should put a single official in charge of all disaster relief operations has drawn support from many sources. In a report to this year's General Assembly Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar supported the proposal and both houses of the United States Congress also backed the idea in the foreign aid bills they adopted this year.

But in two days of General Assembly debate here recently the response of

the third world was lukewarm at best and shot through with suspicion and sometimes outright hostility.

Speaker after speaker welcomed the \$50 million fund Western countries want to establish for quick relief. But they cautioned the General Assembly against giving relief agencies any automatic right to intervene in disaster areas that would place them beyond local control, insisting they may operate in a country only at the invitation of its government.

Speaking for the Group of 77 as the developing countries call themselves, Ghana's representative Kofi N. Awoonor warned that "respect for sovereignty is not an idle stipulation which can be rejected outright in the name of even the most noble gestures."

He added, "The United Nations must not be commandeered into forming an

assistance brigade that will deliver gifts by coercion."

Most Western countries want such right of humanitarian intervention but they know the developing world would block any attempt to write it into international law through a resolution of the General Assembly.

In 1988 the General Assembly adopted a resolution saying affected governments had the "primary role" in organizing disaster relief but urged them to cooperate with international relief agencies. Last year it went a step further by telling governments for the first time that they should also organize "relief corridors" so that food and medicine can be distributed easily and safely to endangered civilians especially when they are caught up in wars.

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